APPENDIX

Power Concentration and Bottom-up Information Flow:

Evidence from Chinese Municipal Congresses

A Data

A1 Data Sources and Coding

This study relies on from multiple sources. Table A1 shows detailed sources. First, I rely on each province's yearbook to obtain names of prefectural party secretaries and chairmen of people's congresses. In the year of political turnover, I confirm the party and legislative leaders who remained in the position for more than six months or the longest. Second, individual characteristics of chairmen in recent years were obtained from government websites, city yearbooks, and media reports. For the early periods, the information of most chairmen is not available on government websites or in encyclopedias. Thus, I also relied on local gazetteers, biographies of historical communist party personages, and other historical materials to obtain information on chairmen.

The dual appointment dummy is equal to 1 when a city's party secretary holds the chairman of the local congress at year t, otherwise 0. I collect the names of the party secretaries and chairmen of congresses from provincial yearbooks. In the year with political turnover, party and legislative leaders are those who remained in the positions for more than six months.

The political cycle may shape legislative activities and leaders' career paths. More local officials may be appointed or removed, and political turnover occurs more frequently in the new round of political cycles in local congresses. The National People's Congress has a five-year term. Over the past two decades, new political cycles started in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018. Legislators at lower levels of congresses are responsible for electing delegates at higher levels. Political cycles in local congresses usually begin one year before that of the national congress, I conduct a political cycle dummy, in which 2002, 2007, and 2012 are 1, otherwise 0.

Protest data is from Social Unrest in China (SUIC) dataset constructed by Ong (2015). Protest refers to the number of social protests occurred in prefecture i in year t. The dataset is

a hand-coded dataset and relies on news reports in Radio Free Asia (RFA) to identify protest events. Before the rise of the social media, RFA covered comprehensive protest information on social protest in China. The study identifies protest events occurred at prefecture level and identifies 2665 protest events between 2002 and 2012. One concern is that the protest data may suffer from report bias in different regions. The main estimated model is the prefecture and year fixed model, and only compares variations within a prefecture. This concern may be relieved.

Figure A1: The Data on Chairmen of MPC



Notes: The figure shows an example of identifying individual characteristics of chairman at one prefecture (Ningde in Fujian Province). The biographic information was recorded in *Historical Communist Party Personages in Fujian Province*.

Figure A2: The Data on Legislative Activities



Notes: The figure gives an example of identifying legislative activities at one prefecture (Baoji in Shaanxi province) in 2011. It shows that the number of legislators attending the annual conference of people's congress was 375, the total number of personnel appointment and removal was 52, and the number of policy proposals, suggestions, and critics were 172. The data comes from the section of people's congress in the *Yearbook of Baoji 2012*.

Figure A3: The Trend of Dual Appointment in MPC



Table A1 Data Sources

Variable	Period	Data Source
Dual appointment	2002-2012	Provincial and city yearbooks
Policy proposals	2002-2012	City yearbooks
Leaders' attributes	2002-2012	Government websites, city yearbooks, media reports, and gazettes
GDP per capita	2002-2012	China Regional Economic Statistical Yearbook
Urbanization rate	2002-2012	China Regional Economic Statistical Yearbook
Number of counties	2002-2012	Ministry of Civil Affairs, http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/xzqh/1980/?2
Fiscal revenue	2002-2012	China Regional Economic Statistical Yearbook
Population	2002-2012	China Regional Economic Statistical Yearbook
Protest	2002-2012	Social Unrest in China (SUIC) dataset
Petition	2002-2012	City yearbooks
Appointment and removal of officials	2002-2012	City yearbooks

A2 Measurement of information flow

In this study, I mainly use the number of proposals to capture bottom-up information flow. One concern is that legislators may submit less proposals with high quality. There may exist trade-off between quality and quantity. Ideally, text analysis on policy proposals can provide further evidence on whether and how dual appointment shapes quantity of information flow. However, to my best knowledge, detailed contents of policy proposals at city congresses are not available. At present, only National People's Congress discloses detailed contents of policy proposals. So we can only rely on number of proposals or suggestions to capture bottom-up information flow.

There are two reasons that the concern can be relieved. First, the composition of legislators are stable within a five-year term, which means that the same group of people submit proposals or suggestions at city congresses. Their legislative behaviors may have stable pattern, they tend to use similar styles to write proposals. In Section 6.2.3, I show that the impact of dual appointment on information flow is not driven by the composition change of legislators.

Second, nearly all proposals are suggestions, criticisms and comments (建议、批评和意见), which can be submitted individually and have low threshold. These proposals usually discuss one small policy issue or proposal one suggestion. Suggestions have format and length requirements, and one suggestion usually discusses one issue. For instance, the National People's Congress once asked legislators to follow the rule of one case one discussion (一事一议) in 2008.[1]. If legislators intend to impress party secretaries, they may tend to submit more policy proposals covering a wide range of policy issues.

[1]Website of Chinese National People's Congress: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/pc/11_5/2008-01/31/content_1686574.htm

A3 Sources of Dual Appointment

Table A2 Sources of Dual Appointment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DV: Dual Appointment			
Protest (t-1)	0.099**	0.100**	0.088**	0.127***
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Number of counties	-0.166***	-0.175***	-0.258***	-0.235***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.065)	(0.069)
Ethnic regions		-2.113***	-1.379*	-1.631*
		(0.742)	(0.704)	(0.913)
Political cycle		-0.311	-0.271	-0.593*
		(0.215)	(0.222)	(0.338)
Population (logged)			1.097*	1.178*
			(0.636)	(0.706)
Fiscal revenue (logged)			-0.469	-0.375
			(0.482)	(0.557)
GDP per capita(logged)			0.488	0.611
			(0.703)	(0.779)
Urbanization rate			0.540	1.082
			(1.201)	(1.309)
Age				-0.554***
				(0.042)
Gender				1.602***
				(0.410)
Ethnic				-0.791*
				(0.435)
Graduate education				1.265***
				(0.273)
Home city				-2.831***
				(0.525)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	3255	3255	3255	3006
pseudo R^2	0.061	0.098	0.123	0.632

Notes: Binary logistical model is used to estimate all results. Robust standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. $*$ p $<$ 0.1; $**$ p$<$ 0.05; $***$ p $<$ 0.01.

B Robustness Check

B1 Robustness Check: Logged Outcome Variables

Table A3 Robustness Check: Logged Outcome Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Proposal (log)			Proposal per capita (log)		
Dual appointment	-0.076***	-0.126***	-0.124***	-0.069**	-0.116***	-0.114***
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Age		-0.001	-0.002		-0.001	-0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Tenure		-0.016**	-0.016**		-0.016**	-0.016**
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Gender		-0.071	-0.072		-0.093	-0.094
		(0.063)	(0.064)		(0.073)	(0.075)
Ethnic		-0.004	-0.004		0.008	0.008
		(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.068)	(0.068)
Graduate education		0.047*	0.043		0.045	0.042
		(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.029)	(0.029)
Home city		-0.007	-0.007		0.001	0.001
		(0.042)	(0.042)		(0.044)	(0.044)
Population (log)			0.168			0.120
			(0.223)			(0.236)
Fiscal revenue (log)			0.037			0.038
			(0.059)			(0.064)
GDP per capita (log)			-0.089			-0.071
			(0.078)			(0.082)
Political cycle			-0.166			-0.133
			(0.127)			(0.136)
Protest			-0.003			-0.002
			(0.004)			(0.004)
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2438	2287	2286	2230	2093	2092
R^2	0.029	0.044	0.046	0.024	0.041	0.042

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

B2 Missing Data

Table A4 Dual appointment and legislators' policy proposal (full results)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Proposal			Proposal per capita	
Dual appointment	-9.461*	-22.991***	-22.555***	-0.028*	-0.063***	-0.062***
	(5.389)	(6.547)	(6.469)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Age		0.043	-0.041		-0.001	-0.001
		(0.837)	(0.822)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Tenure		-3.468**	-3.402**		-0.007**	-0.007**
		(1.388)	(1.366)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Gender		-1.245	-1.404		-0.003	-0.004
		(13.896)	(13.586)		(0.041)	(0.041)
Ethnic		25.893	25.557		0.056	0.055
		(22.661)	(22.441)		(0.047)	(0.047)
Graduate education		11.757	10.956		0.025	0.023
		(7.737)	(7.498)		(0.017)	(0.016)
Home city		-9.512	-9.311		-0.021	-0.021
		(9.065)	(9.054)		(0.026)	(0.026)
Population (log)			38.344			0.113
			(46.180)			(0.139)
Fiscal revenue (log)			-0.762			0.002
			(10.539)			(0.029)
GDP per capita (log)			-20.475*			-0.044
			(12.030)			(0.034)
Political cycle			-49.271**			-0.096
			(23.925)			(0.060)
Protest			-0.539			-0.001
			(1.028)			(0.002)
Number of cities	290	285	285	261	258	258
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2438	2287	2286	2230	2093	2092
R^2	0.032	0.058	0.062	0.024	0.046	0.049

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A5 Dual appointment and legislators' policy proposal (adding covariants one by one)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	DV: Proposal							
Dual appointment	-9.461*	-17.863***	-15.882**	-15.715**	-16.568***	-19.520***	-22.991***	-22.555***
	(5.389)	(6.446)	(6.462)	(6.326)	(6.059)	(6.154)	(6.547)	(6.469)
Age		-1.327**	-0.290	-0.290	-0.323	0.061	0.043	-0.041
		(0.578)	(0.739)	(0.740)	(0.718)	(0.845)	(0.837)	(0.822)
Tenure			-3.164**	-3.154**	-3.143**	-3.174**	-3.468**	-3.402**
			(1.426)	(1.413)	(1.382)	(1.403)	(1.388)	(1.366)
Gender				-2.803	-3.021	-3.104	-1.245	-1.404
				(13.285)	(13.190)	(13.166)	(13.896)	(13.586)
Ethnic					21.188	22.044	25.893	25.557
					(22.764)	(22.611)	(22.661)	(22.441)
Graduate education						11.060	11.757	10.956
						(7.595)	(7.737)	(7.498)
Home city							-9.512	-9.311
							(9.065)	(9.054)
Population (log)								38.344
								(46.180)
Fiscal revenue (log)								-0.762
								(10.539)
GDP per capita (log)								-20.475*
								(12.030)
Political cycle								-49.271**
								(23.925)
Protest								-0.539
								(1.028)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2438	2325	2325	2325	2325	2302	2287	2286
R^2	0.032	0.038	0.046	0.046	0.049	0.053	0.058	0.062

Notes: Robust standard errors are cluster at the city level. Constants are not reported. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$..

Table A6 Multiple Imputed Data: Dual appointment and legislators' policy proposal (adding covariants one by one)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	DV: Proposal							
Dual appointment	-14.483**	-17.786**	-16.608**	-16.213**	-16.166**	-18.645**	-19.549**	-19.279**
	(6.447)	(7.546)	(7.752)	(7.659)	(7.667)	(7.770)	(7.732)	(7.678)
Age		-0.511	0.192	0.196	0.204	0.496	0.519	0.429
		(0.625)	(0.828)	(0.826)	(0.829)	(0.875)	(0.885)	(0.890)
Tenure			-2.223*	-2.207*	-2.245*	-2.367*	-2.383*	-2.334**
			(1.186)	(1.189)	(1.194)	(1.209)	(1.214)	(1.220)
Gender				-6.796	-6.916	-7.249	-7.160	-8.125
				(10.343)	(10.330)	(10.366)	(10.304)	(10.333)
Ethnic					5.677	6.339	7.059	6.936
					(7.270)	(7.271)	(7.490)	(7.412)
Graduate education						8.356	8.518	8.065
						(5.385)	(5.403)	(5.371)
Home city							-3.601	-3.587
							(5.167)	(5.171)
Population (log)								43.056
								(37.696)
Fiscal revenue (log)								6.520
								(8.920)
GDP per capita (log)								-13.923
								(12.547)
Political cycle								34.642
								(22.260)
Protest								1.280
								(1.098)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660	3660

Notes: All results rely on 10 multiple-imputed datasets. The table shows multiple imputation estimation. Constants are not reported. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$..

B3 Robustness Check: Lagged One Year Period

Table A7 Robustness Check: Dual appointment and legislators' policy proposal, lagged one year period

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Proposal			Proposal per capita	
Dual appointment $(t-1)$	-13.014**	-18.830***	-18.616***	-0.031**	-0.045***	-0.044***
	(5.095)	(5.489)	(5.441)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Age		0.683	0.634		0.001	0.001
		(0.852)	(0.841)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Tenure		-4.250***	-4.235***		-0.009**	-0.009**
		(1.500)	(1.477)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Gender		2.077	2.611		0.008	0.008
		(14.055)	(13.828)		(0.042)	(0.041)
Ethnic		29.485	29.019		0.062	0.061
		(24.349)	(23.985)		(0.051)	(0.051)
Graduate education		8.893	8.379		0.015	0.013
		(8.106)	(7.902)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Home city		-11.501	-11.175		-0.030	-0.029
		(9.155)	(9.174)		(0.025)	(0.025)
Population (log)			12.225			0.055
			(44.302)			(0.099)
Fiscal revenue (log)			-0.753			0.005
			(11.330)			(0.031)
GDP per capita (log)			-18.461			-0.037
			(13.376)			(0.036)
Political cycle			64.004**			0.119*
			(28.403)			(0.068)
Protest			-0.751			-0.002
			(1.017)			(0.002)
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2243	2111	2110	2051	1932	1931
R^2	0.030	0.061	0.062	0.024	0.050	0.051

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

B4 Robustness Check: City Types

Table A8 Robustness Check: Exclude Ethnic Regions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Proposal			Proposal per capita	
Dual appointment	-0.082***	-0.121***	-0.119***	-0.074**	-0.107***	-0.104***
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Age		-0.001	-0.002		-0.001	-0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Tenure		-0.011*	-0.011*		-0.011	-0.010
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Gender		-0.071	-0.073		-0.095	-0.097
		(0.063)	(0.065)		(0.073)	(0.075)
Ethnic		0.015	0.017		0.032	0.034
		(0.066)	(0.065)		(0.072)	(0.072)
Graduate education		0.037	0.033		0.034	0.030
		(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.029)	(0.029)
Home city		-0.016	-0.016		-0.009	-0.009
		(0.041)	(0.041)		(0.044)	(0.044)
Population (log)			0.217			0.184
			(0.232)			(0.249)
Fiscal revenue (log)			0.056			0.055
			(0.057)			(0.062)
GDP per capita (log)			-0.097			-0.068
			(0.080)			(0.085)
Political cycle			-0.157			-0.113
			(0.126)			(0.136)
Protest			-0.002			-0.001
			(0.004)			(0.004)
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2271	2133	2132	2065	1939	1938
R^2	0.036	0.046	0.049	0.033	0.043	0.045

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A9 Robustness Check: Exclude Vice Provincial Cities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Proposal			Proposal per capita	
Dual appointment	-0.079***	-0.127***	-0.126***	-0.072**	-0.117***	-0.116***
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Age		-0.003	-0.003		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Tenure		-0.013*	-0.013*		-0.013*	-0.013*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Gender		-0.088	-0.087		-0.110	-0.110
		(0.067)	(0.068)		(0.079)	(0.080)
Ethnic		-0.046	-0.045		-0.038	-0.036
		(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.068)	(0.068)
Graduate education		0.037	0.035		0.036	0.033
		(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.030)	(0.030)
Home city		0.002	0.002		0.010	0.010
		(0.043)	(0.043)		(0.046)	(0.045)
Population (log)			0.139			0.097
			(0.240)			(0.254)
Fiscal revenue (log)			0.050			0.051
			(0.060)			(0.066)
GDP per capita (log)			-0.077			-0.056
			(0.084)			(0.088)
Political cycle			-0.127			-0.091
			(0.132)			(0.143)
Protest			-0.001			-0.000
			(0.005)			(0.005)
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2271	2133	2132	2065	1939	1938
R^2	0.036	0.046	0.049	0.033	0.043	0.045

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. China has 15 vice-provincial cities in China, most of which are province capitals. They include Changchun, Chengdu, Dalian, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin, Ji'nan, Nanjing, Ningbo,Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Xi'an, and Xiamen. In these cities, the party secretaries and chairmen of people's congress hold the rank of deputy minister. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

B5 Robustness Check: Cluster at Provincial Level

Table A10 Robustness Check: Cluster at Provincial Level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Proposal				Proposal per capita			
Dual appointment	-9.461	-22.991***	-22.555**	-22.555**	-0.028*	-0.063***	-0.062***	-0.062***
	(5.659)	(7.952)	(8.167)	(8.167)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age		0.043	-0.041	-0.041		-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.955)	(0.932)	(0.932)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tenure		-3.468**	-3.402**	-3.402**		-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007*
		(1.587)	(1.543)	(1.543)		(0.004)	(0.0 ¿ 04)	(0.004)
Gender		-1.245	-1.404	-1.404		-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
		(15.204)	(14.969)	(14.969)		(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Ethnic		25.893	25.557	25.557		0.056	0.055	0.055
		(23.649)	(23.439)	(23.439)		(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Graduate education		11.757	10.956	10.956		0.025	0.023	0.023
		(8.371)	(8.100)	(8.100)		(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Home city		-9.512	-9.311	-9.311		-0.021	-0.021	-0.021
		(7.382)	(7.277)	(7.277)		(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Population (log)			38.344	38.344			0.113	0.113
			(47.316)	(47.316)			(0.143)	(0.143)
Fiscal revenue (log)			-0.762	-0.762			0.002	0.002
			(10.879)	(10.879)			(0.029)	(0.029)
GDP per capita (log)			-20.475	-20.475			-0.044	-0.044
			(15.686)	(15.686)			(0.038)	(0.038)
Political cycle			-49.271*	-49.271*			-0.096	-0.096
			(28.370)	(28.370)			(0.068)	(0.068)
Protest			-0.539	-0.539			-0.001	-0.001
			(1.065)	(1.065)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province FE				Y				Y
N	2438	2287	2286	2286	2230	2093	2092	2092
R^2	0.032	0.058	0.062	0.062	0.024	0.046	0.049	0.049

Notes: Robust standard errors are cluster at the provincial level. Constants are not reported. * $p <$ 0.1; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$..

B6 Robustness Check: Individual-level Evidence

The delegate data is the only publicly available body of survey data for delegates in Chinese local congresses was conducted by the Research Center on Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University between 2007 and 2009. The data has some limitations. It is cross-sectional data and only covers four cities in Zhejiang, Anhui, and Hunan, which captures limited variation of dual appointment. However, it may provide some micro-level evidence on whether and how dual appointment shapes delegates' motivations and behaviors.

Table A11 presents estimated results using delegate-level data. Dual appointment refers to whether a city party secretary held the chair of the municipal congress where delegates were located at the time of the survey. Outcome variables include the total number of bills, suggestions, and criticisms submitted by delegates and separate numbers of billss, suggestions, and criticisms. Columns (1), (4), and (7) show the baseline results, demonstrating that dual appointment significantly reduces the chances that delegates submitted bills, suggestions, and criticisms. After adding delegates' personal characteristics such as gender, age, government officials, years of schooling, years in congresses, years in local area in columns (2), (5). and (8), the results remain similar. As a robustness check, city characteristics, including GDP per capita and fiscal revenue per capita, are added in columns (3), (6), and (9). The results reveal that dual appointment has only negative and significant impact on the submission of suggestions and criticisms at 1% level but has no evident impact on the submission of bills.

The main results are driven by the declining submission of suggestions and criticisms. As noted above, the submission of suggestions and criticisms has a much lower threshold, and delegates can submit them independently. These submissions are more likely to reflect individuals' preferences and attitudes. To submit a bill, delegates need to initiate a collective proposal and coordinate with other delegates. Table A11 reveals that government officials are less likely to submit suggestions and criticisms. Though the significance disappears after adding city covariants, it provides some evidence that government insiders are reluctant to

provide suggestions and offer criticism.

Furthermore, it is unclear who are more likely to be affected in municipal congresses. Most legislators in local congresses are not full-time delegates and work in various industries. The delegate data contains variables on legislators' occupational types. I use dual appointment to interact with legislators' occupational types, and examine which groups of legislators are more likely to be affected by dual appointment. Table A12 in Appendix shows estimated results. The results reveal that community leaders are less likely to submit proposals under dual appointment, through they are more active than other legislators to submit policy proposals. Community leaders in congresses are village cadres and leaders of residents' committees. These grassroots leaders are agents of state control over society and may be sensitive to power dynamics. However, I don't find significant results that government officials or leaders reduce their submission of proposals under dual appointment. Due to data limitation, the delegate data only covers four cities and have limited regional and temporal variation. The author will further explore this issue when better data is available.

Table A11 Individual level results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
		All			Suggestions			Bills	
Dual appointment	-12.325***	-15.497***	-18.460***	-7.886***	-9.815***	-11.628***	-3.754***	-5.079***	-4.704
	(1.312)	(2.381)	(7.080)	(0.806)	(1.279)	(4.213)	(0.580)	(1.242)	(3.739)
Gender		-0.853	-1.186		-0.595	-0.730		-0.086	-0.201
		(1.881)	(1.904)		(0.921)	(0.918)		(1.041)	(1.073)
Age		-0.068	-0.079		0.011	0.006		-0.087*	-0.092**
		(0.092)	(0.094)		(0.058)	(0.057)		(0.045)	(0.047)
Government official		-2.800**	-2.061		-1.630*	-1.349		-1.006	-0.721
		(1.422)	(1.342)		(0.912)	(0.882)		(0.666)	(0.620)
Schooling		-0.877**	-0.896**		-0.256	-0.267		-0.607***	-0.612***
		(0.394)	(0.395)		(0.223)	(0.223)		(0.209)	(0.210)
Year in congress		1.447***	1.584***		0.882***	0.934***		0.538**	0.593**
		(0.507)	(0.551)		(0.252)	(0.273)		(0.250)	(0.273)
Years in local area		0.043	0.028		0.031	0.024		0.016	0.011
		(0.035)	(0.032)		(0.021)	(0.020)		(0.017)	(0.016)
GDP per capita (logged)			-0.493			-1.795			3.446
			(12.720)			(8.270)			(6.269)
Fiscal revenue per capita (logged)			-5.174			-1.386			-3.498*
			(4.425)			(2.790)			(2.020)
N	701	571	571	746	599	599	797	644	644
R^2	0.105	0.186	0.196	0.109	0.190	0.194	0.042	0.092	0.099

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$..

Table A12 Interaction of dual appointment and occupation types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	DV: All Proposals											
Dual appointment	-18.156**	-18.965**	-18.393**	-19.076**	-20.634**	-19.154**	-18.568**	-19.189**	-19.201**	-18.939**	-17.913**	-18.082**
	(8.923)	(8.880)	(8.865)	(8.955)	(9.275)	(8.861)	(8.794)	(8.920)	(8.875)	(8.956)	(8.883)	(8.924)
Community leader	18.093***											
	(4.636)											
Dual× Community leader	-18.420***											
	(6.214)											
Military and police		8.339										
		(10.085)										
Dual× Military and police		-6.997										
		(12.783)										
Government official			-2.445									
			(2.908)									
Dual× Government official			0.762									
			(4.100)									
Teacher				-2.568								
				(5.672)								
Dual× Teacher				3.974								
				(6.501)								
Government leader					-1.985							
					(2.149)							
Dual× Government leader					2.416							
					(3.167)							
Peasant						9.310						
						(6.681)						
Dual× Peasant						-7.725						
						(9.088)						
Industrial worker							30.298***					
							(9.978)					
Dual× Industrial worker							-24.975					
							(19.942)					
Private businessman								0.396				
								(3.278)				
Dual× Private								1.979				
								(6.043)				
Self-employed entrepreneur									6.969			
									(7.853)			
Dual× Self-employed									9.193			
									(19.081)			
Enterprise manager										-3.732		
										(3.359)		
Dual× Enterprise manager										2.418		
										(4.942)		
Enterprise staff											-12.074	
											(10.086)	
Dual× Enterprise staff											6.293	
											(12.774)	
Skilled worker or professional												-5.211
												(5.226)
Dual× Skilled												4.874
												(6.876)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571
R^2	0.216	0.195	0.196	0.195	0.196	0.197	0.207	0.195	0.197	0.196	0.197	0.196

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Controls include gender, age, schooling, year in congresses, years in local areas, GDP per capita (logged), fiscal revenue per capita (logged). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$..

C Mechanism

C1 Power Concentration

Figure A4 shows procedures for the appointment of local state officials. The first is democratic recommendation, which refers to the process of determining the list of candidates. The second step is appraisal involving assessments of candidates. The third step is deliberation, which compares the strengths and weakness of candidates. The fourth is discussion and decision. After collective discussion the party committee, especially the standing party committee, casts a vote and decides the appointment or removal of an official. The final candidates are determined through this procedure. To appoint or remove state officials, the final step is approval by the local congresses. The party committees submit the recommended candidates to the congresses, and then members of congressional standing committees vote for those candidates.

Table A14 shows the impacts of dual appointment on n the number of appointed and removal of officials in MPC. Column (1) shows that dual appointment has a positive but insignificant effect on the appointment or removal of officials in their first year of tenure, when dual appointment chairmen may not be involved in all elections of state officials and they need time to consolidate power. For a large number of party secretaries, engagement in personnel appointments in congresses begins in the second year of their tenure. They may have greater power and become more influential during this year. Column (2) confirms that dual appointment has a positive and significant effect on the appointment and removal of state officials at 5% level. The estimated coefficient is 14.919, which reveals that party secretaries appoint or remove about 15 state officials in local congresses. The estimated coefficient becomes negative and insignificant in column (3), which indicates that local congresses tend to appoint or remove smaller numbers of officials after large scale personnel changes in the previous year. Columns (4) and (5) show that power concentration has no evident impact on the appointment or removal of state officials in the fourth or fifth year of tenure.

Figure A4: Primary procedures for the appointment of local state officials



Notes: The figure illustrates the main procedures of appointment of local state officials. Party refers to leaders of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), congress indicates leaders of local people's congresses, government refers to local government leaders, CPPCC indicates leaders of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) committee members.

Table A13 Dual appointment on the number of appointed and removal of officials in MPC

	(1) Tenure=1	(2) Tenure=2	(3) Tenure=3	(4) Tenure=4	(5) Tenure=5
Dual appointment	1.519	14.919**	-5.282	1.294	11.207
	(7.107)	(6.737)	(10.198)	(9.375)	(17.448)
Age	0.024	2.079**	-0.779	1.320	-2.152
	(0.599)	(0.927)	(0.807)	(1.189)	(1.787)
Gender	-9.391	-6.159	15.842	7.876	5.886
	(10.932)	(11.599)	(11.850)	(14.274)	(25.224)
Ethnic	24.733	1.193	-5.601	-24.942***	-49.798
	(21.471)	(15.736)	(10.445)	(8.021)	(32.525)
Graduate education	2.112	5.397	6.488	13.766	-31.238***
	(5.867)	(6.627)	(8.210)	(10.373)	(11.875)
Home city	-0.978	1.523	-2.002	4.791	15.504
	(6.342)	(8.136)	(9.316)	(8.568)	(10.550)
Population (log)	115.819	-7.437	-50.843	36.137	68.560
	(87.825)	(53.089)	(49.193)	(53.896)	(67.433)
Fiscal revenue (log)	5.542	8.669	7.793	-12.690	-35.396
	(15.377)	(16.985)	(15.500)	(22.143)	(36.666)
GDP per capita (log)	-6.807	-35.576	-23.641	-53.323	57.655
	(18.160)	(23.616)	(23.822)	(39.197)	(45.925)
Political cycle	16.201	-26.970	-38.706	-102.362*	-12.022
	(31.070)	(35.059)	(42.789)	(57.751)	(64.579)
Protest	3.166***	0.186	-1.439	2.680	-2.841
	(0.679)	(0.816)	(1.256)	(2.944)	(8.213)
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	545	447	386	323	237
R^2	0.142	0.297	0.112	0.349	0.585

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. $*$ p $<$ 0.1; $**$ p$<$ 0.05; $***$ p $<$ 0.01.

C2 Leadership Style

Figure A5: Illustration case: Liu Yupu (1949.8-) in Shenzhen



Dual appointment in Shenzhen

(2008.4-2010.4)

Congress chairman in Shenzhen

(2010.4-2013.1)

2008-2009, dual appointment, 1

2010-2012, dual appointment 0

C3 Composition of Legislators

Table A14 Alternative Specification: Composition of Legislators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Proposal			Proposal per capita	
Dual appointment × Post	18.480*	19.272*	19.353*	0.040	0.038	0.039
	(9.514)	(10.617)	(10.576)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Dual appointment	-16.311***	-25.981***	-25.548***	-0.044***	-0.069***	-0.068***
	(5.710)	(6.618)	(6.561)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Post	-22.825***	-22.140**	-21.808**	-0.052**	-0.043	-0.043
	(8.561)	(11.120)	(10.989)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age		-0.355	-0.440		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.821)	(0.806)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender		-3.704	-3.907		-0.007	-0.008
		(14.375)	(14.111)		(0.042)	(0.042)
Ethnic		26.992	26.673		0.057	0.057
		(22.902)	(22.682)		(0.048)	(0.047)
Graduate education		10.933	10.061		0.023	0.021
		(7.615)	(7.373)		(0.017)	(0.016)
Home city		-8.234	-8.058		-0.019	-0.018
		(9.172)	(9.162)		(0.026)	(0.026)
Population (log)			38.816			0.115
			(45.888)			(0.139)
Fiscal revenue (log)			-0.451			0.002
			(10.481)			(0.030)
GDP per capita (log)			-20.972*			-0.045
			(12.166)			(0.034)
Protest			-0.404			-0.001
			(1.036)			(0.002)
City FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2438	2287	2286	2230	2093	2092
R^2	0.044	0.059	0.063	0.033	0.046	0.049

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

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