APPENDIX

How Natural Resources Affect Corruption in China

Procedure of Collecting and Coding Resource Data

Figure A.1: Example of Raw Data for Oil Production

Location of oilfields: Ar Horqin Banner

科尔沁油田位于内蒙古自治区赤峰市阿鲁科尔沁旗境内，处于科尔沁沙地边缘，平均海拔高度275m，高差5m左右，为前倾斜起伏和缓的沙地草原。该地区特点是河谷地宽广，阶地不明显，区内广泛分布着流沙、固定沙丘与半固定沙丘，沙丘高度在 20 ~ 50m 之间，沙丘与丘间洼地构成了地貌组合。

| 时间 | 动用储量 | 油 井，口 | | 年产油 | 年产水 | 累计产油 | 累计产水 | 综合含水 | 年采油速度 | 采出程度 | 水井，口 | | 注水量 | |
	10⁴t	总井数	开井数	10⁴t	10⁴t	10⁴t	10⁴t	%	%	%	总井数	开井数	年注水 10⁴t	累计注水 10⁴t
2001	2691	425	321	11.3204	19.6296	194.9642	146.0172	70.40	0.42	7.25	127	44	40.1952	484.9291
2002	2601	427	283	10.2326	20.2020	205.1968	166.2192	68.70	0.39	7.89	139	50	37.8636	522.7927
2003	2601	439	339	11.4860	21.0865	216.6828	187.3057	65.10	0.44	8.33	144	52	35.7430	558.5357
2004	2725	467	357	14.4951	23.8096	231.1779	211.1153	66.40	0.53	8.48	146	35	25.4027	583.9384
2005	2270	466	387	13.9830	33.5692	245.1609	244.6845	74.60	0.62	10.80	152	69	34.9121	618.8505

注：茨榆坨采油厂编制，2010 年。

Annual oil production data

We collected oil and gas production and reserve data from China Oil and Gas Field Development Report. Around 2010, China Oil Industry Press published the Oil and Gas Field Development Report for each large oilfield. For instance, the above figure shows a screenshot of the Oil and Gas Field Development Report of Liaohe Oil and Gas Area. Khorchin oilfield (科尔沁油田) is a sub-oilfield of this area. First, based on the geographic information of oilfields, we identify the county-level unit where the oilfields are located. If an oil or gas field crosses a county border, we split the production quantity equally among the relevant counties. A particular county may house several oilfields, and we aggregate the annual production of all oilfields within that county to derive the county-level oil production. Finally, we compute the mean oil or gas production between 2000 and 2005.

Figure A.2: Example of Raw Data for Coal Reserves

屋结构为砖混结构。职工吃粮吃菜初期要到40公里以外的山下去运。1970年自备汽车运输，职工生活才有改善。1982年每周派车送粮送菜到采掘队和住户区。1970年建有男、女浴室，设有大小水池及淋浴头，均用蒸气冲水。1990年有医务室3个，专业医务人员4人。有电影队、电视录像，井、队有篮球场，1979年新建能容纳300人的电影院。

（二十）阿坝藏族自治州所属煤矿

阿坝州13个县中有若尔盖、阿坝、汶川、红原、松潘5县有煤炭及泥炭分布。含煤地层由老到新有志留系上统独峰组、三叠系上统须家河组及上第三系，还有第四系泥炭。独

第二章　地、县属煤矿及乡镇煤矿　711

峰组含煤1层，厚0.29～6.80米，属富—高灰、富硫无烟煤。须家河组一般含可采煤3层，单层厚0.32～2.12米，为中—富灰、特低硫烟煤、无烟煤。上第三系自上而下分三组，含煤总厚32.5米，为褐煤，原煤灰分在50%以上。第四系泥炭分布面积1600平方公里。1990年有州属阿坝州煤矿、县属千斤沟、八角庙、独峰和阿坝州漩口煤矿，乡镇煤矿2个，国营煤矿职工187人，生产原煤1.6万吨，工业总产值135.5万元。原煤产量占全省总产量的0.05%，居各地、市、州的第二十位。

表12－3－18　1990年阿坝州州、县属煤矿基本情况一览表

名　称	所在地址	煤种牌号	隶属关系	矿井可采储量（万t）	生产能力（万t）		投产年月	1990年原煤产量（万t）	年末职工人数（人）	交通运输
					设计	核定能力				
阿坝州煤矿	汶川县	肥煤	州属	10.00	1处	1处	1958	0.01	54	
千斤沟煤矿	汶川县	肥煤	县属	11.00	1处	1处	1966	0.05	46	汽车转运
八角庙煤矿	汶川县	无烟煤	县属	2.80	1处	1处	1979	0.19	41	汽车转运
独峰煤矿	若尔盖县	无烟煤	县属	31.20	1处	1处	1980	0.27	14	汽车转运
阿坝州褐煤厂	阿坝县	褐煤	县属	13.40	1处	1处	1974	0.60	32	汽车转运

We collected coal reserve data from a series of China Coal Industry Chronicle. Since 1990, China Coal Press published the China Coal Industry Chronicles for each province. The book includes a chapter describing local coal mines owned by prefectures, counties, and towns. We summed all discoverable coal reserves of all coal mines located within a county to calculate the county's coal reserve quantity. For instance, the above shows a screenshot of the China Coal Industry Chronicle for Sichuan province in 1997. The left box shows all coal mines located in Wenchuan County, and the right box indicates the discoverable coal reserves of those coal mines. We added them together and obtained the coal reserves for Wenchuan County. While the quantity of the reserves, in general, does not change frequently, if there is any new discovery in a given year, we recalculate the average amount.

Appendix Tables

Table A.1 Ethnic-minority and Non-ethnic-minority Regions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Corruption Investigation		Misuse of		Corruption Investigation		Misuse of
	All	Grassroots Officials	Senior Officials	Government Funds	All	Grassroots Officials	Senior Officials	Government Funds
		Ethnic-minority regions				Non-ethnic-minority regions		
Oil sales	-0.006	-0.005	-0.001	-0.003	0.008	0.010	-0.002	-0.011
(log)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.011)
Gas sales	-0.025	-0.020	-0.005	-0.026	0.009	0.008	0.001	0.023
(log)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.017)
Coal sales	0.005	0.005	-0.000	-0.008	0.006*	0.005*	0.001	0.008**
(reserve, log)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	694	694	694	620	2034	2034	2034	2013
R^2	0.552	0.557	0.287	0.593	0.488	0.496	0.437	0.600

Notes: Ethnic-minority regions refer to ethnic minority autonomous provinces, prefectures, and counties. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Corruption investigation refers to the average number of officials investigated between 2012 and 2016. Grassroots officials refer to those ranked *fuke* (vice section chief) and *zhengke* (section chief). Senior officials refer to those ranked *fuchu* (division chief) and above. Oil sales, gas sales, and coal sales are average county-level sales values between 2000 and 2005. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $*$ $p < 0.1$; $**$ $p < 0.05$; $***$ $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2 Coastal and Inland Regions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Corruption Investigation		Misuse of		Corruption Investigation		Misuse of
	All	Grassroots Officials	Senior Officials	Government Funds	All	Grassroots Officials	Senior Officials	Government Funds
			Coastal regions				Inland regions	
Oil sales	0.018	0.017*	0.001	0.007	-0.001	0.001	-0.003	-0.019
(log)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.015)
Gas sales	-0.037	-0.019	-0.018	-0.052	0.009	0.007	0.002	0.021
(log)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.017)
Coal sales	0.004	0.004	-0.000	0.018**	0.007**	0.006**	0.001	0.001
(reserve, log)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	715	715	715	713	2013	2013	2013	1920
R^2	0.451	0.456	0.502	0.555	0.502	0.514	0.267	0.611

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Corruption investigation refers to the average number of officials investigated between 2012 and 2016. Grassroots officials refer to those ranked *fuke* (vice section chief) and *zhengke* (section chief). Senior officials refer to those ranked *fuchu* (division chief) and above. Oil sales, gas sales, and coal sales are average county-level sales values between 2000 and 2005. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p < 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A.3 Economic Development (GDP Per Capita)

	(1) Corruption Investigation All	(2) Misuse of Government Funds	(3) Corruption Investigation All	(4) Misuse of Government Funds
	Low GDP per capita		High GDP per capita	
Oil sales	-0.001	-0.002	0.016*	-0.013
(log)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Gas sales	0.006	0.038*	-0.013	-0.042*
(log)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Coal sales	0.006	0.001	-0.000	0.002
(reserve, log)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
N	1887	1802	841	831
R^2	0.536	0.649	0.562	0.685
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1654	1607	1074	1026
R^2	0.533	0.669	0.615	0.701

Notes: Low GDP per capita indicates that GDP per capita in the county is below the national average between 2000 and 2005. High GDP per capita indicates that GDP per capita is above the national average betweem 2000 and 2005. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A.4 Government Size (Share of Government Employees)

	(1) Corruption Investigation All	(2) Misuse of Government Funds	(3) Corruption Investigation All	(4) Misuse of Government Funds
	Small Government Size		Large Government size	
Oil sales	0.015	-0.005	-0.006	-0.012
(log)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Gas sales	-0.003	-0.015	0.023	0.034
(log)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Coal sales	0.006	0.003	0.008**	0.008
(reserve, log)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1654	1607	1074	1026
R^2	0.533	0.669	0.615	0.701

Notes: Small government size indicates that government employee per capita in the county is below the national average between 2000 and 2005. Large government size indicates that government employee per capita is above the national average betweem 2000 and 2005. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A.5 Poisson regression: natural resources and corruption investigation

	(1) Corruption Investigation All	(2) Corruption Investigation Grassroots Officials	(3) Corruption Investigation Senior Officials
Oil sales	0.010	0.014*	-0.022
(log)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.022)
Gas sales	0.002	0.003	-0.000
(log)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.043)
Coal sales	0.007**	0.007**	0.006
(reserve, log)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y
Controls	Y	Y	Y
N	2728	2728	2728

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Corruption investigation refers to the average number of officials investigated between 2012 and 2016. Grassroots officials refer to those ranked *fuke* (vice section chief) and *zhengke* (section chief). Senior officials refer to those ranked *fuchu* (division chief) and above. Misuse of government funds is the average misuse of funds between 2000 and 2005. Oil reserve sales, gas reserve sales, and coal reserve sales are average county-level reserve sales values between 2000 and 2005. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $* \, p < 0.1$; $** \, p < 0.05$; $*** \, p < 0.01$.

Table A.6 Exclusion of Outliers: Shanxi ands Inner Mongolia

	(1) Corruption Investigation All	(2) Corruption Investigation Grassroots Officials	(3) Corruption Investigation Senior Officials	(4) Misuse of Government Funds
	Exclude Shanxi			
Oil sales	0.007	0.008	-0.001	-0.010
(log)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.010)
Gas sales	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.012
(log)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.015)
Coal sales	0.005*	0.005*	0.000	0.006*
(reserve, log)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2609	2609	2609	2514
R^2	0.503	0.511	0.421	0.622
	Exclude Inner Mongolia			
Oil sales	0.007	0.009	-0.002	-0.012
(log)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.010)
Gas sales	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.016
(log)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.016)
Coal sales	0.005*	0.005*	0.001	0.006*
(reserve,log)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2627	2627	2627	2532
R^2	0.493	0.501	0.419	0.617

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Corruption investigation refers to the average number of officials investigated between 2012 and 2016. Grassroots officials refer to those ranked *fuke* (vice section chief) and *zhengke* (section chief). Senior officials refer to those ranked *fuchu* (division chief) and above. Misuse of government funds is the average misuse of funds between 2000 and 2005. Oil sales, gas sales, and coal sales are average county-level sales values between 2000 and 2005. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A.7 Natural Resource Reserves and Corruption

	(1) Corruption Investigation All	(2) Corruption Investigation Grassroots Officials	(3) Corruption Investigation Senior Officials	(4) Misuse of Government Funds
Oil reserve sales	0.009*	0.009*	-0.000	-0.005
(log)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Gas reserve sales	-0.040	-0.035	-0.005	0.014
(log)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.025)
Coal reserve sales	0.006**	0.005**	0.001	0.006*
(log)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2728	2728	2728	2633
R^2	0.495	0.503	0.416	0.617

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Corruption investigation refers to the average number of officials investigated between 2012 and 2016. Grassroots officials refer to those ranked *fuke* (vice section chief) and *zhengke* (section chief). Senior officials refer to those ranked *fuchu* (division chief) and above. Misuse of government funds is the average misuse of funds between 2000 and 2005. Oil reserve sales, gas reserve sales, and coal reserve sales are average county-level reserve sales values between 2000 and 2005. Control variables include GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, population density, urbanization rate, and fiscal transfer. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. $*$ p < 0.1; $**$ p< 0.05; $***$ p < 0.01.

Table A.8 Alternative Corruption Perception Measure: CGSS 2015

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DV: Perceived Corruption of Local Officials			
Oil sales	-0.005	-0.002	-0.007	-0.002
(log)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Gas sales	0.006	0.003	0.014	0.005
(log)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Coal sales	0.008**	0.007*	0.014**	0.013*
(reserve, log)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Controls		Y		Y
Province FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	3022	2854	3022	2854
R^2	0.057	0.068		
pseudo R^2			0.021	0.025

Notes: Control variables include individuals' urban hukou, year of schooling, ccp membership, income (logged), age and gender. Columns (1) and (2) rely on OLS. Columns (3) and (4) rely on ordinal logistical regression. $*\,p < 0.1$; $**\,p < 0.05$; $***\,p < 0.01$.

Table A.9 National Level Resource Production and Corruption Perception

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		1995-2019				1995-2011		
All production (logged)	-2.718***				-2.522***			
	(0.858)				(0.758)			
Oil production (logged)		0.430				-2.718		
		(1.326)				(2.345)		
Gas production (logged)			-2.981**				-1.829	
			(1.058)				(1.306)	
Coal production (logged)				-1.776**				-1.768**
				(0.756)				(0.619)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	25	25	25	25	17	17	17	17
R^2	0.887	0.852	0.888	0.877	0.904	0.875	0. 886	0.899

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The outcome variable is the corruption perception index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International. A higher CPI indicates that a country has less perceived corruption. CPI data is available from 1995. Between 1995 and 2011, CPI ranges from 0 to 10. Starting from 2012, CPI ranges from 0 to 100. To make the index comparable across different years, we divided CPI by 10 after 2011 in Columns (1) to (4). The subsequent columns limit the data to 1995 to 2011. Resource data and control variables were collected from *China Statistical Yearbook*. Control variables include GDP per capita (logged), urbanization rate, fiscal revenue per capita, and population density. $* \ p < 0.1; ** \ p < 0.05; *** \ p < 0.01$.

Table A.10 Inclusion of Additional Controls

	(1) Corruption Investigation All	(2) Corruption Investigation Grassroots Officials	(3) Corruption Investigation Senior Officials	(4) Misuse of Government Funds
Oil sales	0.003	0.005	-0.003	-0.010
(log)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.010)
Gas sales	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.012
(log)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.015)
Coal sales	0.005*	0.005**	0.000	0.007**
(reserve,log)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	0.107**	0.094**	0.014	0.205***
	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.058)
Fiscal revenue per capita	0.350	0.088	0.261	2.596**
	(0.964)	(0.699)	(0.399)	(1.311)
Population density	-9.378	-8.816	-0.562	-7.191
	(9.413)	(7.065)	(4.910)	(14.443)
Urbanization rate	-0.370***	-0.373***	0.004	-1.362***
	(0.101)	(0.089)	(0.033)	(0.169)
Fiscal transfer	0.174***	0.151***	0.023***	0.392***
(log)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.052)
Law enforcement	2.134**	1.720**	0.414	3.001*
	(0.883)	(0.786)	(0.271)	(1.725)
Party secretary's age	-0.184*	-0.171*	-0.013	0.157*
	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.010)	(0.087)
Mayor's age	0.047	0.062	-0.015	-0.066
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.011)	(0.067)
Party secretary from	6.968**	6.712**	0.256	-10.813
same prefecture	(3.381)	(3.191)	(0.378)	(7.215)
Mayor from	-1.193**	-1.062*	-0.131	-0.193
same prefecture	(0.607)	(0.562)	(0.093)	(0.584)
Distance to prefecture	-0.010	-0.005	-0.004	-0.090***
(log)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.017)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	2556	2556	2556	2474
R^2	0.502	0.507	0.437	0.622

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Corruption investigation refers to the average number of officials investigated between 2012 and 2016. Grassroots officials refer to those ranked *fuke* (vice section chief) and *zhengke* (section chief). Senior officials refer to those ranked *fuchu* (division chief) and above. Misuse of government funds is the average misuse of funds between 2000 and 2005. Oil sales, gas sales, and coal reserve sales are average county-level reserve sales values between 2000 and 2005. Law enforcement is the average proportion of public security expenditure in total fiscal expenditure at a county government between 2000 and 2005. Party secretary's or mayor's age refers to the prefecture party secretaries' and mayors' average age between 2000 and 2005. Party secretary or mayor from the same prefecture indicates the average proportion of prefecture party secretaries or mayors working in prefectures they were born between 2000 and 2005. Distance to prefecture is the distance between a county's administrative center to the prefecture administrative center. All controls are average values between 2000 and 2005. * p < 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

Table A.11 Data Sources

Variable	Period	Data Source
Oil Production	2000-2005	China Oil and Gas Field Development Report
Gas Production	2000-2005	China Oil and Gas Field Development Report
Coal Reserve	—	China Coal Industry Chronicle
GDP Per Capita	2000-2005	China Local Finance Statistic Yearbook
Fiscal Expenditure	2000-2005	China Local Finance Statistic Yearbook
Fiscal Transfer	2000-2005	China Local Finance Statistic Yearbook
Urbanization Rate	2000-2006	China County Statistical Yearbook
Law enforcement	2000-2005	China Local Finance Statistic Yearbook
Party secretary's age	2000-2005	Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED))
Mayor's age	2000-2005	Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED)
Party secretary from same prefecture	2000-2005	Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED)
Mayor from same prefecture	2000-2005	Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED)
Corruption Investigation	2012-2016	Tencent (from Wang and Dickson (2022))
Misuse of Government Funds	2000-2005	China Audit Yearbook

Figure A.3: Example of Interdependence between Local Government and the Coal Mine Industry

Senior leaders

bribe | protection and promotion

Local leaders

bribe and lobby

bribe | protection and mining licenses

Local officials — protection → **Businessmen in coal industry**

← family ties

Based on the case in Shanxi province, we plot a figure to illustrate the interdependence between the local government and the coal mine industry. Specifically, we rely on news reports on corruption in Lüliang to draw the figure.[23] Local leaders and officials are given authority to wield substantial control over mining permits and hold decisive authority over safety regulations in coal mines. In order to secure and continue political protection and obtain mining licenses, local coal mine owners resort to bribing these officials and leaders. The local leaders depend on these illicit exchanges with businessmen to bribe senior officials and secure higher-ranking positions within the government. Furthermore, coal mine owners may even directly engage in politics by becoming members of the local People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) or legislative members within the People's Congress, which help acquire protection and establish political networks. They may also facilitate the appointment of their family members as government officials to exert influence over local leaders.

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[23]The case has been reported in detail in many news outlets including the *New York Times* (https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/world/asia/china-anti-corruption-campaign-takes-toll-on-luliang-shanxi.html) and Chinese media such as the *Caixin* (https://china.caixin.com/2014-10-21/100740817.html).

Table A.12 County Leaders Investigated Between 2012 and 2021 in Inner Mongolia

Prefecture	County/District	Name	Position	Year of Investigation
Chifeng	Ar Horqin	Zhou Chunyi	Party secretary	2014
Erdos	Dongsheng	Zhang Jiping	Party secretary	2014
Erdos	Dongsheng	Lin Jin	Mayor	2015
Erdos	Dongsheng	Zhang Ping	Party secretary	2015
Xilin Gol	Erlianhot	Bao Chongming	Party secretary	2015
Ulangab	Siziwang	Xiao Wanshou	Party secretary	2015
Erdos	Otog	Liu Guihua	Party secretary	2020
Hulunbuir	Hailar	Yang Guohong	Party secretary	2021
Ulanqab	Qahar Right Middle Banner	Liu Chao	Party secretary	2021
Ulanqab	Qahar Right Middle Banner	Zhang Haiming	Mayor	2020
Ulanqab	Huade	Huo Jianzhong	Party secretary	2019
Xilin Gol	Sonid Left Banner	Xing Wenfeng	Party secretary	2021
Hohhot	Saihan	Yun Zhonghou	Party secretary	2020
Tongliao	Horqin Left Middle banner	Liu Baitian	Party secretary	2021